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found reversible error, however, in requiring the state to pay an
award to the lessee for lease advantage in addition to payment to
the lessor of the value of the unencumbered property. 9 The
Holmes case is ably discussed in a student Note in this issue.40

PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Albert Tate, Jr.*
No procedural decision of any great consequence was rendered during the year, even though almost a third of the 1400 appellate opinions included procedural issues. This may demonstrate the clarity of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure of
1960 and the efficiency of its working. The discussion of the year's
jurisprudence concentrates, therefore, on the few trouble areas
and recommends statutory change where indicated by nearly ten
years of experience with the Code.
ACTIONS AND PARTIES

Cumulation of Actions
The 1960 enactment liberalizes cumulation of actions and
permissive joinder of parties, an important Code reform.1 A
plaintiff may cumulate against a defendant all consistent actions,
even though based on different grounds, providing certain simple
procedural requirements are met, such as each being properly
venued. If multi-plaintiffs or multi-defendants are joined, there
must then also be "a community of interest" between the parties
joined, that is, the cumulated actions must arise out of the same
2
facts or present the same factual and legal issues.
The cumulation articles have worked well in practice. The
39. Id. at 814.
40. Note, 30 LA. LAW REv. 346 (1969).
* Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit; Teacher of
Civil Procedure at the Louisiana State University Law School, 1967-69. The

writer acknowledges the research and editorial assistance afforded him by
David E. Soileau, Law Clerk, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for the 1969-70
term, member of the Evangeline and Calcasieu Parish bars.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 461-65, 647. See McMahon, The Joinder of Parties
in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. Rsv. 1 (1958).

2. LA. COD@ CIV. P. art. 463(1), comment (c).
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leading decision of Dickson v. Sandefur3 is an outstanding example. There, a plaintiff joined eighteen defendants in possessory
actions against each of them, despite the circumstance that the
defendants might each conceivably rely upon factually differing
(although generically similar) defenses or claims of title. Insofar
as differing defenses might unduly burden other defendants, the
appellate court pointed out that the 1960 Code authorizes separate trial of properly cumulated actions. 4
The 1960 Code indicates that courts should order separate
trial even of improperly cumulated actions, rather than dismissing them (as pre-1960) or requiring election between them.5 The
Louisiana articles are based upon the theory now commonly accepted "that no inconvenience can result from the joinder of any
two or more matters in the pleadings, but only from trying two
or more matters together which have little or nothing in common."6
It is discouraging, therefore, to note that in two instances
during the term the courts ignored the 1960 cumulation reforms.
One, People of the Living God v. Chantilly Corp.,7 might serve
as a casebook example of how not to decide a cumulation problem. A plaintiff sued an adjoining landowner and his general
contractor both (a) to recover damages for pile driving subsidence during construction operations, and also (b) for injunctive
relief to abate certain construction operations or practices which
interfered with the plaintiff's enjoyment of its property. The
trial court held the actions improperly cumulated and ordered
the plaintiff to elect upon which action to proceed, under penalty
of dismissal. The plaintiff failed to elect, and its suit was dismissed. The appellate court affirmed, holding damage and injunctive actions could not be cumulated because they did not
meet the Code requirements of employing "the same form of
procedure."" (Emphasis added.)
In so holding, the court overlooked that the "form" referred
3. 181 So.2d 75 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); discussed, The Work of the Lou-

isiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Civil Procedure, 27 LA. L.
REv. 540, 542-43 (1967).

4. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 465.
5. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 464. See id. comment (c): "Separate trials of the
actions improperly cumulated is the usual solution of the problem, and requiring the plaintiff to elect would be ordered only in those unusual cases
where separate trials of the actions is not feasible."
6. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 13 (1938); see
C,.CLARK, CODE PLEADINGS 48 (2d ed., 1947).

7. 211 So.2d 445 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
8. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 462(2), 463(3).
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to merely requires that each of the cumulative actions employ
either ordinary, executory, or summary procedure.9 The two
principal demands cumulated were for a money judgment and
for injunctive relief. Both arose out of the same facts, the construction activities on the adjoining land. Both principal demands
are triable by ordinary procedure, thus employing the same
"form" of procedure."0 Therefore, the actions cumulated by the
plaintiff met the Code requirements for cumulation, and the
court erroneously denied cumulation.
In holding the cumulation improper, the court pointed out
that a jury trial was available for the damage action, but not for
the injunction action (no one had sought trial by jury), as well
as certain differences in the treatment of appeals, such as that a
permanent injunction may not be appealed suspensively as of
right, while the damage action may. Citing a pre-1960 decision,
the court concluded that the two actions could not be cumulated
"because of the complications that would result."'1 The court's
refusal to permit cumulation because of these (exaggerated)
procedural difficulties ignores the Code criteria authorizing cumulation of two or more actions against the same defendant. The
court should not have refused cumulation when the Code requirements were met; its reliance upon pre-1960 case decisions overlooks the intent of the Code to overrule legislatively the pre-1960
jurisprudence to the contrary.
Finally, however, the appellate court committed serious
error in affirming the trial court's judgment ordering election
between the actions held improperly cumulated, under penalty
of dismissal. To do so ignored the thrust of the Code provisions
that prejudice is to be avoided through separate trials-whether
9. LA. CODE Cxv. P. art. 463, comment (a).
10. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts 3601-13 regulate primarily the provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction. This is ordinarily ancillary to a principal demand,
in order to prevent irreparable Injury during the pendency of an action.
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3601. The preliminary injunction does utilize summary
procedure. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3602, 3609. However, the principal demand
for the permanent Injunction Is tried after the same delays and with the
same evidence as any other ordinary action. LA. CODE CIrv. P. art. 851 provides
that articles governing ordinary proceedings apply "in all cases, except as
otherwise provided by law." No statutory provisions provide that the action
for a permanent injunction shall be tried other than by ordinary proceedings. See also Baton Rouge Cigarette Service, Inc. v. Bloomenstiel, 88 So.2d
742, 746-48 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
11. People of the Living God v. Chantilly Corp., 211 So.2d 445, 446 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968).
12. The trial court's election requirement Is not discussed in the present
opinion, but It was set forth In an earlier opinion In the same appeal. Id. at
197 So.2d 748, 749 (1987).
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the cumulation is proper or improper-rather than to cause multiplicity of suit and further delay through election or dismissal.13
Unfortunately, no review by the supreme court was sought of
this ruling.
In the other unhappy cumulation opinion during the year,
the supreme court by way of dicta wrongly indicated that a defendant might have successfully objected to the cumulation by
two plaintiffs of claims for injunctive relief because these two
demands were based upon "separate and distinct causes of action."'14 Since each plaintiff's demand arose out of the same
seizure by a judgment creditor, there was undoubtedly the requisite community of interest between their claims. The court seems
to have overlooked completely that lack of identity in the causes
of action is immaterial, if the other Code requirements facilitating cumulation are met.
Compulsory Joinder
The 1960 Code sought to govern by statute compulsory joinder
of necessary or indispensable parties questions previously successfully regulated by the jurisprudence only.15 The effort of the redactors has on the whole probably produced more litigation and more
confusion on the issue than existed prior to the 1960 attempt to
clarify the question. 1 Essentially, "indispensable" parties are
those whose interests are so interrelated and directly affected
that a complete adjudication of the controversy cannot be made
unless they are joined.'1 Their absence may be pleaded or noticed
by the trial or appellate courts at any time, 8 with the action dismissed if the indispensable party cannot be joined.'9 On the other
hand, a "necessary" party is one whose joinder would permit a
complete adjudication of controversy, but whose interest is separable and would not be directly affected by the judgment if not
before the court. 20 A party desiring the joinder of another as a
13. See LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 464, 465.
14. Household Fin. Corp. of Baton Rouge v. LeJeune, 252 La. 691, 698,
212 So.2d 546, 549 (1968).
15. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 641-46. See abo "Preliminary Statement" to
Chapter 1 (Joinder), Title III (Parties), LA. CODE CIV. P.; and McMahon,
The Joinder of Parties in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1958).
16. Cf., e.g., pre-1960 and post-1960 annotations to Article 641 In 2 LSACODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (West 1960).
17. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 641.
18. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 645, 927.
19. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 641; Vincent v. Hunt, 221 So.2d 577 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969).
20. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 642.
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"necessary" party waives his right to require compulsory joinder,
if the objection is not pleaded at the threshold by a timely dila21
tory exception.
The classifications are conceptual in nature and subject to
varying interpretations. The attempt to require joinder, or to
make issue of the failure of the trial court to do so, offers tactical
opportunity to delay or to complicate the disposition of the litigation; although, of course, the general aim to facilitate disposition of related claims in a single suit is commendable. The characterization of a party as indispensable can be particularly onerous to those desiring swift termination of the litigation, since no
stage-preclusion bars the contention of non-joinder from being
raised or noticed even on appeal and, if upheld, from thus re22
quiring remand for joinder and then retrial.
In Consolidated Credit Corp. of Baton Rouge v. Forkner,28 a
judgment creditor asked the court to declare how the proceeds of
a judical sale of the debtor's property under fieri facias should
be distributed between (a) the debtor's homestead claim of $4,000,
(b) a first mortgage on the property, in which the debtor had
waived her homestead rights, and (c) the judgment held by the
creditor. The debtor appealed from a determination that the
first mortgage be paid first out of any proceeds, the debtor next
receiving any excess between the mortgage debt and $4,000, and
the creditor's claim following. Noticing the absence of the first
mortgagee, the appellate court without discussion assumed that
this absentee was an indispensable party and remanded the proceedings to start over again.
It is to be noted that any execution sale was subject to the
first mortgage, which primed the judicial mortgage of the creditor.24 The first mortgagee could not be prejudiced by the sale,
since no sale could take place unless a bid was received sufficient
to discharge this superior mortgage. 25 The only issue on appeal
was whether the property could be sold for a minimum price
sufficient to cover only the $4,000 homestead exemption, from
21. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 645, 926, 928.
22. The conflicting policy objectives of compulsory joinder, as well as

cogent suggestions for criteria based upon consideration of the actual interrelated (but sometimes competing) interests, are summarized in the
classic article Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions. 55 MICH.
L. REV. 327, 483 (1957). See also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE, §§ 9.14-9.20 (1965).
23. 219 So.2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
24. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 2335, 2372, 2378.
25. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2337.
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which the first mortgagee would be paid, or whether instead the
price bid must be sufficient to pay both the first mortgage and
the homestead claim. This issue concerned only the judgment
creditor and the judgment debtor, and neither complained of
non-joinder.
Within the functional reasons why parties are so classified,
the first mortgagee was simply not an indispensable party. The
underlying policies behind so classifying parties include a weighing of three factors: "(1) the unfairness to those present of proceeding without an absent party; (2) the effect on the absentees
of a determination of the controversy before the court; and (3)
the court's ability to determine finally the rights of the parties
before it in a manner which cannot be aborted by action of an
absent party. '26 Consideration of the present facts will show that
factors (2) and (3) were absent, while the risk of factor (1)
was minimal. This suggests that the absent mortgagee was at
most a "necessary" party, whose non-joinder was waived by the
defendant's threshold failure to raise the issue.
Yet the long-delayed execution of a judgment was to be
delayed by a remand for yet another trial, as well as possibly
another appeal, and the additional expense (to the parties and
to the absentee) of joining as "indispensable" an absent party
who essentially had no interest in how the judgment creditor
and the judgment debtor resolved their particular dispute!
Just as the Louisiana compulsory joinder articles do now,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, when originally promulgated in 1937, attempted to regulate joinder on the basis of abstract concepts, not of functional considerations such as those
noted above. Because of the confusing and impractical judicial
applications, the rule was revised in 1966 to require joinder or
not on the basis of the true policy considerations, sometimes conflicting, such as the practical impairment of the protection of an
absentee's interest, substantial risk to any of the parties of incurring multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations, or the
adequacy of the relief possible without the joinder.2 7 Similar
revision of the Louisiana articles on the subject seems indicated
by the growing confusion in their judicial applications.
26. Comment, 71 HARV. L. REV. 877, 880 (1958).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, a8 amended, 1966. See Advisory Committee's Note
recommending the 1966 revision.
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Proper Parties
In Phillips v. Garden2s a car owner had sued for damages
resulting from personal injuries. The owner had alleged that he
suffered property damage of $1,100 through the total destruction
of his car, but he did not seek recovery for it (because a collision
insurer had paid most of it). When the collision insurer's intervention was dismissed for procedural reasons, 29 the car owner
sought to amend his petition, after the prescriptive year, to recover the property damages of $1,100 sustained. The appellate
court commendably allowed the amendment to relate back to
the time suit was filed, insofar as the owner's individual loss of
$50 was concerned;3 0 but it refused to allow him to make claim
for the $1,050 paid by the collision insurer, on the ground that
it, as the subrogee, was the sole proper party to sue for it. 81
In the writer's view, expressed elsewhere, 2 this is an improper application of the proper-party articles beyond their
limited procedural objectives. Substantive justice is denied because technically a "wrong" but closely related plaintiff asserts
the action, although the defendant has full notice of the claim
within the prescriptive period. This result is reached by the
mechanical application of the principle expressed by article 681
that "an action can be brought only by a person having a real
and actual interest" in the claim asserted. To avoid similar misapplications, the counterpart federal rule was amended in 1966
to provide expressly that an action shall not be dismissed as
brought by a party without legal interest, unless opportunity
for joinder or substitution relating back to the initial filing is
first given.88 Similar amendment of Louisiana article 681 seems
in order.
The proper-party problem of the subrogor-subrogee was
raised in two other interesting aspects during the year. In Carl
28. 211 So.2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
29. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
30. See LA. CODM Cv. P. art. 1153.
31. See LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 697.
32. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-67 TermMiW Procedure, 28 LA. L. REv. 386, 396-400 (1968); Tate, Amendment of
Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 TUL. L. REv. 211, 236-38 (1969).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 17, as amended, 1966. The amendment provides: "No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced
in the name of the real party in interest."
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Heck Engineers, Inc. v. Daigle84 an automobile owner sued a
garageman for the value of his vehicle, destroyed by fire while
in the garage for repairs. The suit was brought within the prescriptive year. After the year, the owner filed a supplemental
petition to show that, prior to suit, the car owner's fire insurer
had paid him $2,150 as the value of the vehicle and had further
agreed that the owner could sue for these damages on behalf of
the insurer. The trial court, however, rejected the claim of $2,150
vehicle damage. It held the insurer alone could assert the claim,
that it did not do so within a year of the fire, and that the claim
had therefore prescribed. The court of appeal properly reversed,
pointing out that an agent has the procedural capacity to sue for
a principal when specially authorized. 85
Of special cogency was the court's application of the subrogor-subrogee proper-party article in accordance with its functions only-to protect the debtor from multiple harassment by
suit, to prevent the subrogor from collecting twice, and to assure
the subrogee authority over its claim.86 When these interests are
not invaded, as in the instant case, the procedural article should
not be applied so as to cause unnecessary multiple litigation or
as to deny substantive rights.
The other subrogor-subrogee decision involves the situation
where each files a separate suit. In this instance, a prior timely
suit by the subrogor will not save from prescription the subrogee's suit filed after the prescriptive year.8 Yet if the subrogee's
claim were asserted by amendment of petition in the timely filed
suit of the subrogor, then prescription might be avoided through
the Code provision which expressly permits amendment within
8
a suit to relate back to the. initial filing
Substitution of Parties
The Code provides that, once filed, "An action does not abate
on the death of a party." 9 It contains provisions to effectuate the
voluntary or compulsory substitution of parties who die after
the action is filed. 40 Lawyers therefore frequently assume that,
34. 219 So.2d 294 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
35. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 694.
36. Carl Heck Engineers, Inc. v. Daigle, 219 So.2d 294, 298 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1969), discussing LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 697.
37. American Security Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 220 So.2d 163
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
38. LA. CODE! Civ. P. art. 1153.
39. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 428.
40. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 801-04.
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if a party dies after the action is brought, there is no danger of
loss in substantive rights by delaying substitution of the successor
until trial. At least one exception exists, however, which occasionally traps the unwary. Civil Code article 2315 provides for
the survival of actions for damages caused by offense or quasioffense. In 1960, it was amended so as to avoid most of the overtechnical abatement problems of the prior jurisprudence. 4' However, the article still provides that the tort action "shall survive
for a period of one year from the death of the deceased" in favor
of the survivors. The pre-1960 jurisprudence interprets this, technically, to mean that the survivors must substitute themselves
within a year of a tort plaintiff's death, even though he himself
had timely filed suit. 42 Thus, the Fourth Circuit was presumably
correct in Marvin v. Toye Brothers Yellow Cab Co., 48 in holding

that the surviving children's claim was extinguished by peremption, when they waited more than a year after their parents'
death before substituting themselves as plaintiffs.44 But the supreme court has not so held yet.
ORDINARY PROCEEDINGS

The Action for a Declaratory Judgment
In Vignes v. Jarreau45 the first circuit held that an action for
a declaratory judgment could not be used to establish a boundary
between two properties; that other statutory provisions 46 provide
the sole procedural remedy by which this may be done. The supreme court denied writs of review, noting that "The result is
correct" (emphasis added), two justices dissenting. 47 In the
writer's belief, the appellate courts were patently in error, in
thus reversing the trial court, which had established the boundary on the merits, and in dismissing the petition on an excep41. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315, as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 300. See "Explanatory Note-Henry G. McMahon" at 9 LSA-Civu. CODE 13 (West, 1969
Supp.).
42. Miller v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 42 So.2d 328 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1949).

43. 214 So.2d 196 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
44. Of course, once the survivors of the tort-injured person have filed
suit or substituted themselves as plaintiff, then, if they die, by the express
terms of revised article 2315 their claim is inherited by their heirs as property
(see Blanke v. Chisesi, 142 So.2d 45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), and sources cited
in note 41 supra), without time limit on substitution save that an action is
deemed abandoned if no step is taken for five years in its prosecution or
defense, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 561.
45. 222 So.2d 566 (La. App. let Cir. 1969).
46. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 823-55; LA. COON Civ. P. arts. 3691-93.
47. Vignes v. Jarreau, 223 So.2d 871, 874 (La. 1969).
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tion that the pleading stated no cause of action for declaratory
relief.
First, the intermediate appellate court mistakenly characterized the declaratory action as summary in nature, thus (the
court noted) making such action inapplicable in view of another
Code provision 48 that boundaries are established by ordinary
proceedings. This overlooks article 851's classification of modes
of procedure as ordinary, summary, and executory, and its provision that the articles governing ordinary proceedings apply to
all actions "except as otherwise provided by law." No provision
exempts the action for declaratory relief 49 from ordinary proceedings. This type of action simply does not fall into the Code
definition of summary proceedings: "those which are conducted
with rapidity, within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observation of all the formalities required
in ordinary proceedings."
Even more important an error, however, was the court's refusal to permit the action for declaratory relief despite the clear
intent of the 1960 codification to overrule prior jurisprudence
which had barred the declaratory action where another remedy
was available. 5' The decision overlooks a prime purpose of the
1960 Code: to avoid dismissal on technical objections to the wording of pleadings seeking justiciable relief.5 2 It overlooks that an
action for declaratory relief is identical with any other action
seeking the same substantive ruling, except that the decree technically only declares the rights of the parties rather than awarding specific relief. 53 The ruling is especially unfortunate in the
area of real actions, where in advance of evidentiary findings
relating to possession and prescription it may be difficult to ascertain whether the petitory, possessory, or boundary action is
most appropriate to determine ownership of lands along the
54
boundary of two contiguous properties.
48. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3693.
49. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 1871-83.
50. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2591.
51. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1871, Comment; Giroir v. Dumesnil, 248 La.
1037, 184 So.2d 1, 21 A.L.R.3d 765 (1966).
52. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 862, 865, 2164, attempting to abolish the "theory
of a case" doctrine and the slot-method of adjudication, 4.e., no justice
rendered, unless the pleading fits snugly into an appropriate slot.
53. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1871, Comment; See, e.g., Erath Sugar Co. v.
Broussard, 240 La. 949, 125 So.2d 776 (1961).
54. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ayers, 219 So.2d 794 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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Incidental Actions
In 1960, the incidental actions were simplified and broadened.
The reconventional demand now permits the defendant in the
principal action to assert any claim whatsoever he has against
the main plaintiff, regardless of connexity or venue considerations,55 and even though its assertion requires the joinder of
third parties to the action. 56 The right of a third person to intervene is enlarged to permit assertion of all justiciable rights related to or connected with the main demand.57 The federal thirdparty practice is assimilated into the new Code, greatly increasing the right to implead third persons beyond the old call in
warranty.5 The trial court is authorized discretion to allow
separate trial of principal and incidental actions, where appropriate to avoid undue prejudice to other parties through burdensome joinder of issues unrelated to their interests.59 Dismissal of
automatic dismissal
the principal action can no longer cause the
0
suit.
the
in
filed
demand
incidental
an
of
Nevertheless, the Louisiana incidental actions are largely
based upon historical antecedents. They do not necessarily permit joinder of related claims and parties upon the basis of coherent regulation of the question. For instance, as historically
derived, no incidental action permits one defendant to assert a
claim against a codefendant arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the principal actionthe cross-claim of federal practice. 61
A typical situation of this nature is Bellow v. New York Fire
& Marine Underwriters,Inc.62 A passenger in a bus involved in
a bus-truck collision sued the operators of the bus and of the
truck for his personal injuries caused through their concurring
negligence. The defendant bus operator filed what he termed a
"third-party petition" against the truck operator, claiming property damage caused allegedly through the sole negligence of the
truck operator. At the trial on the merits, the negligence of
the truck operator was held to be the sole cause of the accident.
On appeal, the contention was made that the bus operator could
55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1061.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

CODE CIv. P. art. 1064.
CODE Civ. P. art. 1091.
CODE CIv. P. art. 1111.
CODE Civ. P. art. 1038.
CODE CIV. P. art. 1039.
See FED. R. C v. P. 13(g).
215 So.2d 350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
LA.
LA.
LA.
LA.
LA.
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not recover against the truck operator, because no procedural
vehicle permitted a cross-claim by one defendant against another. 3 The court nevertheless held that, with respect to the
plaintiff's claim against the truck operator, the bus operator was
a "third person"; he was thus permitted to intervene under the
greatly broadened right of intervention, because his claim arose
out of the same facts and negligence as were asserted by the
plaintiff in his principal demand against the truck operator. This
liberal interpretation of the Code articles seems consistent with
the intent of the intervention provisions to avoid multiplicity of
action, with possible inconsistency of judicial result. Thus, a
jurisprudential solution has remedied the legislative hiatus of
cross-claim.
Article 1094 provides that an intervener "cannot object to
the form of the action, to the venue, or to any defects and informalities personal to the original parties." This requires the
intervener to take the proceedings as he finds them, without delaying their disposition by raising technicalities not urged by the
parties. 4 In City of Natchitoches v. State,65 the plaintiff asserted
that the intervener could not therefore question the cause of
action asserted by the petition. The court of appeal rejected these
contentions. The provision was held not to prevent an intervener
from raising objections which go to the existence of the plaintiff's
right to a remedy or to his cause of action, when these objections
are essential to the intervener's claim; since then they go to the
substance, not the form, of the plaintiff's demand. In light of the
functional aim of the Code provision, this sort of objection by
an intervener is not barred.
Article 1033 provides that, after answer, leave of court must
be obtained to file an incidental action, in order to prevent late
filing from retarding the progress of the suit. 6

In Phillips v.

63. The third party demand was unavailable to the first defendant
against the second defendant, because this device is available only to a defendant against another person "who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the principal demand [i.e., that asserted by the plaintiff against the
defendant]." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1111. A reconventional demand was not
available, because this device Is available only to assert actions "against the
plaintiff in the principal action." LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1061 (emphasis added).
It was argued that the intervention was also not available, because technically this device is for a "third person having interest," not a co-defendant.
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1091 (emphasis added).
64. See LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 1094, comment; Cahn v. Ford, 42 La. Ann.
965, 8 So. 477 (1890); Parish v. Holland, 166 La. 24, 116 So. 580 (1928).
65. 221 So.2d 534 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
66. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1033, comment.
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7
Garden,6
an otherwise allowable intervention was filed on the
last day of the prescriptive year for a tort action. Since no leave
of court was obtained, the court held the filing ineffective; it
therefore held the claim asserted prescribed. While this is in accord with comparable rulings relating to the leave of court required for amended or supplemental pleadings," it is doubtful
that this harsh substantive result should obtain simply because
the intervener neglected the procedural formality of having the
trial court sign pro forma a two-line order permitting intervention. In comparable federal leave-to-amend situations, the pleading filed without leave is permitted to stand if leave to amend
would have been granted had it been sought at the time.6 9 Probably legislative revision of this nature might best avoid the use
of procedural objection based upon this technicality to defeat
substantive rights otherwise asserted timely.

Separate Adjudication of Separate Issues
Sometimes a distinct issue exists in a litigated case which
may:dispose of the suit: for example, the issue of coverage in a
direct action against a liability insurer ;70 the issue of liability as
distinguished from quantum in a tort action;" the issue of ownership in an injury suit for premise defects; 72 the issue of a quitclaim by plaintiff's ancestor to the defendant's ancestor, in a suit
for ownership of the land.7 8 Yet, as the decisions cited show, in
Louisiana no procedural device exists, by exception or otherwise,
permitting separate adjudication of the separate issues. Louisiana's traditional policy disfavoring piecemeal trial 74 is an essential theme throughout our procedure. As we have noted,
separate trial and separate adjudication of incidental actions is
authorized, 75 although separate judgments are appropriate only
67. 2*1 So.2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
68. See Robinson v. Williams, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 665 (La. 1825); Wallace v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 164 So.2d 111 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Martino v. Fairburn,
71 So.2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Anding v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 1 La. App.
180 (1st Cir. 1924), rev'd on other grounds, 158 La. 412, 104 So. 190 (1925).
69. Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941); W. BARRON & A. HOLTzOFT, FEDERAL PRAMC'c & PROCEDURs, 444 (Wright ed. 1960).
70. Leteff v. Maryland Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
71. Bettencourtt v. Boyd, 209 So.2d 339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
72. Duplain v. Wiltz, 174 So. 652 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
73. Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 231 La. 704, 92 So.2d 589 (1956).
74. See LA. CODS Clv. P. art. 1915, comment (b); LA. CoDs Crv. P. art. 2083;
see also, Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc., 227 La 127, 78 So.2d 534 (1955);
Bielkiewicz v. Rudisill, 201 So.2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
75. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 1038.
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in exceptional instances.7" In the absence of statutory authorization, separate adjudication is not permitted,77 however useful it
might be. For instance, in a personal injury suit, the issues of
negligence and contributory negligence might require only a few
witnesses in a half-day trial; once this is decided finally, the much
more expensive and cumbersome trial of the medical disability
and damages might be unnecessary, or avoided through compromise.
The counterpart to this trial court policy on the appellate
level is the appellate court's refusal to review adjudications of
partial trials, remanding for full trial of all issues, even though
an affirmance of the partial judgment might dispose finally of
the entire suit upon the issue adjudicated separately. Under the
classic policy, an appellate court will remand an appeal upon an
adjudication on negligence tried separately from damages below,
refusing to review the issue even though all parties are willing
for the court to decide this issue separately. 78 The twin policies
avoid prolonged litigation, multiple trial appearances of witnesses
and fragmentation of their testimony overlapping several issues,
and multiple adjudications and appeals, with the possibility of
multiple reversals and remands.
Despite lip-service to this doctrine, and with solemn adjurations of "never again," in three decisions during the year the
appellate courts reviewed the separately tried issue of negligence-contributory negligence (without damage evidence), and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the entire action on the
ground of no liability. 9 But what if these instances concerned
reversals rather than affirmances? Then, the intermediate courts
would be forced to remand for trial of damages; and the supreme
court, applying its traditional policy,80 would deny review of this
76. IA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1038, comment (b); LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1915(1),

(4), comment (b).
77. A district court may consolidate separate suits involving a common
issue of law or fact for trial, or it may order a joint trial of any of their
common issues. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1561. Inherent in the court's power to
control the proceedings before it, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1631, 1632, is the reasonable authority to order separate trial of different issues. But neither of
these statutory powers permits a separate adjudication by appealable final
judgment of any separate issue.
78. Jeansonne v. Willie, 188 So.2d 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
79. McDonald v. Book, 215 So.2d 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Powell v.
Continental Ins. Co., 212 So.2d 739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Danos v. Central
Nat'l Ins. Co., 211 So.2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
80. See McLain v. Zurich Ins. Co., 254 La. 13, 222 So.2d 67 (1969): "Writ
refused. The judgment is not final. Relator may reurge the assignment of
error in the event of adverse judgment [on the merits]."
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non-final intermediate determination. Thus the adjudication
would not be final until after a trial on remand, a second appeal
to the intermediate court, and, at last, the supreme court's denial
or grant of certiorari on the merits.
Yet counter-considerations of judicial efficiency in this day
of more complicated litigation, with the greater trial expense of
expert witnesses and modern discovery and joinder policies,
might require modification of this traditional policy. If so, guidance might be found in the provisions of federal practice permitting separate trial of issues and, in exceptional cases, appellate
review of dispositive interlocutory rulings.8 1
A closely related separate-adjudication question was dis82
cussed by Professor Donald Tate in a recent faculty symposium.
He points out that the Louisiana practice of permitting through
exception separate trial of merit-defense issues is largely based
upon their conceptual function, each narrowly limited by historical development rather than by some general scheme. For
instance, a defense based upon the plaintiff's compromise with a
defendant may be tried by a peremptory exception pleading res
judicata, upon which evidence is admissible.83 Yet closely related defenses-such as estoppel through the plaintiff's compromise with a third party8 4 or as extinguishment of an obligation
through the plaintiff's voluntary release of the defendants!--are
defenses to the cause of action and must be tried on the merits
unless apparent from the face of the plaintiff's petition, since no
evidence is admissible to determine an exception pleading no
cause of action. 6 Again, a threshold evidentiary hearing is available to decide that the plaintiff has no interest in land he claims,
because of a quitclaim executed by his ancestor in title in favor
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) permits separate trial of issues "when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy." FED. R. App. P. 5 regulates the discretionary appeals from interlocutory judgments authorized by
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958). The latter provision permits leave of court to
grant appellate review of an interlocutory order concerning a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differing view,
where an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
82. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 TermCivil Procedure, 27 LA. L. REV. 540, 544 (1967).
83. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 927(2). 931.
84. Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So.2d 919 (1960), discussed
at The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1960-1961 Term-Civil
Procedure, 22 LA. L. REV. 370, 374 (1962).
85. Bielkiewicz v. Rudisill, 201 So.2d 136 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
86. LA. CODE CiV. P. arts. 927(4), 931. Of course, evidence can be considered when introduced without objection at the trial of the exception.
Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So.2d 919 (1960).
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of third persons;8 7 but not if the quitclaim was executed in favor
of the ancestor in title of the defendant. 88 Further, if there is the
slightest conflict in evidence, the motion for summary judgment
is not an appropriate procedural device for threshold disposition
of the issues.89
Professor Tate suggested evaluation of the merits of substituting the federal-rules approach of a coherent general regulation permitting separate threshold trial of defenses based upon
practical considerations, for the present conceptual and imprecise criteria largely derived from historical rather than logical
reasons. Of course, one consideration against change is that the
present system of exceptions-though not based upon a rational
general scheme and though often producing unnecessary fullscale trial on the merits-has become well-formulated through a
century's experience and, within its limits, permits efficient disposition of issues properly so raised.
Jury Trials
The Louisiana Constitution permits full appellate review of
facts.2 One result is a relative scarcity of jury trials, since a
theoretical advantage of sympathetic lay judgment is not immune from revision by the possibly differing judgment of the
appellate judges. From a purely administrative point of view,
meritorious effects include expeditious trial dockets (unhampered
by the greater lengths of numerous jury trials causing backlog
and delay), and also the final determination of the case upon
only one appeal on the merits (since the appellate court can redetermine the facts without remand for retrial, as in common
law jurisdictions). A by-product of viewing a jury-determination
as not sacrosanct is that trial technicalities, such as jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, have until now been regarded as
not all-important, since not determinative of the results of an
appealY1
87. State ex rel. Adoma v. Meraux, 191 La. 202, 184 So. 825 (1938). This
defense is properly raised by the exception pleading no right of action or
want of interest, for ta. trial of which evidence is admissible. LA. COD Civ.
P. arts. 927(5), 931.
88. Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 231 La. 704, 92 So.2d 589 (1956). This
defense was held to relate to no cause of action, so that no evidence was admissible.
89. LA. CODs Civ. P. arts. 966-68; Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d
27 (1963).
90. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
91. Carter v. Foreman, 219 So.2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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Two recent decisions by the state supreme court may be regarded as unfortunately importing procedural gamesmanship
into the Louisiana use of jury trial. In Bienvenu v. Angelle, 92
the intermediate court refused to reverse and remand for erroneous jury instructions (or even consider whether they were
erroneous), affirming on the record as a whole without invoking
the manifest error presumption. 3 The supreme court reversed."4
Finding an instruction erroneous, it reversed for retrial, holding
that "[t]he instructions given to the jury . . . were so erroneous
that there is no assurance that the jury could make a legal determination of the issues before it." 95 There is much merit in the
high court's analysis of the function of the trial court as the essential trier of fact, with the appellate court's function being
limited to review for error rather than to retry. The net effect
of the holding, however, is that Louisiana jury trials are now
burdened both with the theoretical disadvantages of Louisiana
appellate review and also with the administrative disadvantages
of retrials and multiple appeal because of procedural technicalities inherent in common-law jury-trial review.
In the other jury trial decision of note, the supreme court resolved a dispute between the first circuit on the one hand and
the second and third on the other. The issue concerned the proper
procedure when the plaintiff demands jury trial in a suit against
multiple defendants, but is not entitled to jury trial against one
or more of them. 98 Article 1735 prohibits piecemeal jury trials of
the same case, requiring there be but one trial of any issue triable
by jury.97 Therefore, two resolutions of the issue are permissible:
(a) that the case be tried without jury, the plaintiff in result
waiving his right to jury trial by joining a non-jury defendant,
as held by the first circuit; 98 (b) that there be concurrent trials
of the same issue, with the trial judge separately deciding the
non-jury demand, as held by the second and third circuits.9 9 The
92. 211 So.2d 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
93. See Broussard v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 111 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966).
94. Bienvenu v. Angelle, 223 So.2d 140 (La. 1969). Two Justices dissented,
and two justices concurred in the result only.
95. Id. at 146.
96. Discussed, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1967-68 Term-Civil Procedure, 29 LA. L. Rmv. 269, 287 (1969).
97. LA. CODe CIV. P. art. 1735; Arrington v. McCarty, 136 So.2d 119 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961), discussed, The Work of the Lou4siana Appellate Courts
for the 1961-68 Term-Civil Procedure, 28 IA. L. REv. 378, 386-87 (1963).
98. Abercrombie v. Gilfoll, 205 So.2d 461 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
99. Watson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 214 So.2d 395 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968); Jobe v. Hodge, 207 So.2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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latter circuits in part relied upon the successful federal practice
to this effect, in application of the federal source rule for article
1735.100 They also felt that by so doing they gave effect both to
the Code provisions granting the plaintiff the right to jury trial
of certain demands, as well as to the statute prohibiting trial by
jury against a public body.101
In Jobe v. Hodge,102 the supreme court overruled these latter
circuits and adopted the view of the first circuit. It held that
maintenance of the prohibition against jury trial against public
bodies barred jury trial even against the other defendants, in
view of article 1735's prohibition of multiple trials. The crux of
its reasoning is that the concurrent or fragmented trial "can only
operate to destroy the independent determination of either the
judge or the jury in their conscious or unconscious efforts to
avoid the ludicrous consequences of opposite results reached in
the same trial on the same evidence."'1 3
The closeness of the issue is instanced by the dissent of three
justices and the division among the circuits. The present federal
and the former Louisiana practice of concurrent trials has worked
well, without requiring the plaintiff to sacrifice his right of jury
trial against certain of multiple defendants. It is difficult to accept the majority's theoretical considerations as outweighing the
successful former practice which gave effect to both the jury
trial and non-jury trial provisions. Also, a defendant desiring to
avoid jury trial might under the majority rationale deprive a
plaintiff of his right to jury trial by impleading a non-jury thirdparty defendant, however weak the claim against the latter.
In another jury-trial review of note, the supreme court instructed the intermediate appellate courts to make findings of
fact on appeals from jury verdicts.' 0 ' The indicated reason was
that otherwise there was no basis for reviewing whether the
correct principles of law were applied to the facts so found.
Miscellaneous
Finuf v. Johnson 5 provides an important clarification of
the procedure for moving for a new trial after judgment in the
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a).

101. LA. R.S. 13:5104 (1950), as added by La. Acts 1960, No.27, § 4.

102.
103.
104.
105.

253 La. 483, 218 So.2d 566 (1969).
Id. at 491, 218 So.2d at 570.
Rowe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 La. 659, 219 So.2d 486 (1969).
216 So.2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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district court. Article 1971 provides that a new trial may be
granted "upon contradictory motion of any party." Article 1976
provides that notice of the motion for new trial and of the time
and place of hearing "must be served upon the opposing party
as required by Article 1314." (Emphasis added.) Article 1314
provides for service by the sheriff of all pleadings which require
an appearance or answer. 0 6 The revision comment indicates that
a change was intended from the practice of service by mail (instead of by sheriff) of such motions, yet examination of over a
thousand appellate records indicates that almost universally motions for new trial are served by mail as formerly. The justification for the practice is that a simple motion for a new trial is
filed, which does not assign a date for a hearing and thus (any
more than an exception) does not require responsive pleadings
nor appearance and, therefore, need not be sheriff-served. 107
In Finuf v. Johnson,l 08 the subject case, trial court had sustained a motion to strike the motion for a new trial. The grounds
were that the motion did not fix a time and place for hearing
and that it was not served by the sheriff, as allegedly required
by articles 1971, 1976. The second circuit reversed. The court
pointed out that the validation of a filing for new trial is not
dependent on any formality of service or of assignment for trial,
since these are separate and distinct acts. Objection to informalities of service or assignment may require service or assignment
anew, but will not justify striking from the record as invalid
this important procedural step which, if timely, interrupts the
running of delays for appeal. The court also approved the use
of a simple motion and, thus, of the inexpensive and sensible
procedure generally followed by the bar. Not the least of the
106. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 1314 literally provides for service by the sheriff
of all pleadings "which may not be mailed or delivered under Article 1313."
LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 1313 permits service by mailing to opposing counsel of
any pleading "which requires no appearance or answer."
107. The mechanics of fixing the hearings on the application for new
trial by simple written motion are: A motion to fix it for hearing is made
in open court rather than by written motion. The motion to fix, when made
in open court, may be oral, LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 961, and an oral motion is
not a "pleading" (see IA. CODS Civ. P. art. 852, defining the pleadings as including "written motions"). Therefore, LA. CoDs Civ. P. arts. 1312-1314, regulating service of "pleadings," are inapplicable. The opposing counsel receives
notice of the fixing by virtue of the requirement that all district court rules
must provide for adequate notice of trials to all parties. LA. CODS CIV. P. art.
1571(1). Such notices generally are given by written letter of the district
clerk, although no express Code formality governs the form of the notice
(except, where a prior written request for said notice is filed, in which case
the clerk must give written notice to the party at least ten days before the
date fixed, LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 1572).
108. 216 So.2d 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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values of this important opinion is its disapproval or at least
severe limitation of the illiberal and overtechnical rationale of
McDonald v. O'Meara,0 9 which (under aggravated circumstances,
it is true) had sustained for procedural defects a motion to strike
an application for new trial.110
On another subject, the thoughtful opinion in Gates v. Hanover
Ins. Co."' is considered erroneous in its holding that the trial
court has discretion whether or not to allow an amendment of
the petition to remove the grounds for an exception. Article 934
provides that a judgment sustaining the exception "shall order
such amendment within the delay ordered by the court." (Emphasis added.) The article also provides that the action shall be dismissed "[i]f the grounds of the objection cannot be so removed"
(emphasis added), but the trial court has no special insight to
determine that the grounds of the exception cannot be removed;
by the mandatory terms of the Code article, it has no discretion
not to allow amendment. Either the plaintiff is entitled to amend
as a matter of law, or he is not. The usual practice is to allow
him an opportunity to attempt amendment if he so desires. The
holding is in conflict with at least two other decisions on the
question during the year.112
APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Ordinarily, an appeal by a defendant brings up for review
only the correctness of the judgment rendered against him, not
the correctness of the trial court's action in dismissing or granting demands against any codefendants.1 1 " To this rule, the jurisprudence has created one exception: Where the defendantappellant may otherwise be denied contribution from codefendants possibly liable in solido, the defendant's appeal also brings
before the court the issue of contribution, despite the plaintiff's
failure to appeal from the dismissal of the suit against such co14
defendants."'
109. 149 So.2d 611 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
110. Since the motion for a new trial was struck from the record as invalid, the mover was deprived of his right to appeal; for, by the date the
motion to strike was sustained, the delays for appealing had expired.
111. 218 So.2d 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
112. Verret v. Travelers Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 379 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968);
Demery v. Voelker, 216 So.2d 328 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
113. Lomenick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 189 So.2d 731 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966).

114. Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594 (1963);
Murry v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 198 So.2d 532 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967);
Vidrine v. Simoneaux, 145 So.2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

In Williams v. City of Baton Rouge,115 the supreme court
refused to follow this rationale. There, two defendants, an employer and the father of the negligent employee, had been held
solidarily liable for $2,500. Both appealed. The plaintiff answered
the appeal only as against the employer, and he obtained an increase in the award of $10,000 as against the employer. The court
refused, however, to amend the judgment so as further to hold
the codefendant father solidarily liable for this increase in the
award-thus the employer was held liable for $10,000 damages,
while the supposedly solidarily liable father was held for only
$2,500. It denied the increase against the father because it was
not sought by the appellate pleadings, since, the court stated,
he was not made an appellee as to the employer's appeal.
This rationale overlooks the contribution exception and
applies the general rule that, in the absence of a third-party
or other demand by one defendant against the other, an appellant's appeal only brings before the reviewing court the correctness of the trial court's judgment as to the only demand appealed, that is, that by the plaintiff against the defendant. Under
this general rule, an appeal does not bring up for review the
correctness of the trial court's decision of other demands between
the plaintiff and other defendants-appellees. 11
This had been pointed out by the intermediate court in
Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co.,117 a decision reversed by the
supreme court""' in the lead case establishing the contribution
exception. As the intermediate court had pointed out in Emmons,
the issue is not whether one defendant is to be denied contribution, for that can be obtained by subsequent suit where one
defendant does not seek contribution by third-party demand
1 9
The real issue is only
against the other in the instant suit.
whether it is preferable to determine contribution in the single
suit rather than through a subsequent action. In reversing, the
supreme court in Emmons determined that contribution should
be decided in the one suit, despite the absence of third-party
demand or other pleadings asserting the right to contribution.
In the present Williams decision, the court erroneously dis115. 252 La. 770, 214 So.2d 138 (1968).
116. See Barrios v. Noto, 215 So.2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Simmons
v. Gulf Union Life Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 790 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968). See a/o
Gorum v. Pritchard, 173 So.2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
117. 150 So.2d 94 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
118. 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594 (1963).
119. LA. CODE Clv. P. art, 1113.
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tinguished the Emmons progeny as involving a different procedural stance than that before it, namely, only an unrestricted
appeal by one defendant from the plaintiff's judgment against
it. The dissent of Justice Sanders correctly analyzed the majority's mistake in rationale. The confusing inconsistency of
Williams with Emmons will need clarification by subsequent
jurisprudence or by legislation.
EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS

The landmark decision of League Central Credit Union v.
Montgomery'2" was discussed in the last symposium.121 Resolving a conflict in the prior jurisprudence, the supreme court in
that case held a mortgage debtor could defend against a deficiency judgment by, for the first time, contending that the seizure
and sale by executory process was invalid for technical procedural reasons. Previously, substantial authority had indicated
that the debtor waived procedural defects by failing to enjoin or
suspensively appeal the executory proceedings. The League
Central holding will have great impact on office practice and the
use of executory process, requiring much greater care and attention to minute detail to avoid impairing a client's right to a
deficiency judgment; for there the mortgage creditor was deprived of a deficiency judgment by an insignificant procedural
122
defect.
The supreme court expressly limited its holding to avoid
annulment of a sale after the mortgaged property passed into
the possession of a third person purchaser. Left unanswered,
however, was whether, by reason of such procedural defect, the
mortgage debtor might annul a sale under executory process
to the mortgage creditor himself, and thus recover the property,
even though the debtor failed to enjoin or suspend the sale at
the time it was made. This was the situation before the court in
Jambois 0. & M. Machine Shop, Inc. v. Dixie Mill Supply Co.,123
at least insofar as the fifteen thousand dollars worth of mortgaged property not resold after the judicial sale and still in the
120. 251 La. 971, 207 So.2d 762 (1968), noted In 29 LA. L. REV. 405 (1969).
121. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-68 TermCivtl Procedure, 29 LA. L. tEv. 269, 298-99 (1969).
122. The acknowledgment of a chattel mortgage executed under private
signature before two witnesses was held to be deficient, because the mortgagee
signed it rather than the mortgagor or a witness as statutorily required.
A. R.S. 13:3720 as amended, La. Acts 1952, No. 470.
123. 218 So.2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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possession of the purchasing mortgage creditor at the time of
suit. In refusing to annul the sale, the court relied upon its
12 4
earlier decision in White Motor Co. v. Piggy Bak Cartage Corp.,
which the supreme court had expressly overruled in League
Central at least insofar as applying to third persons. Reliance
upon this scholarly decision was misplaced, for it concerned
a situation where (unlike the present) all of the mortgaged property sold at the judicial sale was in the possession of innocent
third person purchasers at the time the suit to annul the sale
was filed.
Nevertheless, the Jambois decision is right in result. There
are valid reasons why a mortgage debtor should not be able to
annul a sale when he did not enjoin or suspend it; and yet should
be allowed to rely upon these same procedural defects to prevent
a deficiency judgment against him in excess of the value at judicial sale. On the one hand, the mortgage creditor's security up
to the value of the property securing the debt should be protected, so that the debtor delinquent in raising procedural defenses to the sale should be held to have waived them. On the
other, in view of the latter day consumer-protection policies
disfavoring deficiency judgments,125 a personal judgment in
monied amount beyond the value of the property ought not be
allowable unless the creditor follows the letter of the law when
he uses the short-cut procedures permitting his immediate seizure
and sale of the property through executory process. It is unfortunate that the deciding court in Jambois did not come to
grips with League Central's application, as raised by the briefs,
and did not decide the case on the basis of the true considerations
rather than of the inapplicable White Motor Co. decision.
CONCLUSION

The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 has been in
effect for almost ten years. On the whole, it has effectively
accomplished its purpose of simplifying civil practice in Louisiana and of subordinating procedural devices to the proper role
of serving as hand-maiden to substantive justice. The writer
shares the general view that our Code is a major procedural
reform and an enduring monument to the vision of the late Dean
Henry George McMahon and his colleagues who drafted it.
124. 202 So.2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
125. Cf., e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1968) (from Truth in Lending Act of 1968,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.).
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Nevertheless, the first years of operations have indicated
areas which should be restudied and most probably revised. It
has been the writer's duty to review intensively the Louisiana
procedural decisions of the last three years for evaluation in this
faculty symposium. In this, the third and final performance of
this pleasant task, an effort has been made to suggest these few
major problem areas and possible cures, as follows:
1. The need for revision of criteria for compulsory joinder
of necessary and dispensable parties;120
2. The need for Code amendment to prevent the proper1
party articles from being misused to deny substantive justice; 2
3. The possible need for rationalization of the incidental
actions and for revision of the requirement for leave of court
to prevent substantive injustice based upon this procedural technicality;128
4. Consideration of allowing separate trials and adjudications of severable issues, and of interlocutory appeals with leave,
under limited conditions;129
5. In line with 4, consideration of instituting a rationalized
general policy of allowing separate threshold trial of defenses
which might conclude the litigation, in place of the present
scheme of specialized exceptions with function delineated by
chiefly historical considerations.130
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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SEARCH WARRANTS-REQUISITE

RECITALS OF SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT

Mapp v. Ohio," holding that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in state as well as federal courts, necessitated a careful
review of state search warrant procedures. It is important that
search warrants be validly issued, to the end that the property
seized will be admissible in evidence in subsquent criminal proceedings. Thus, article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
126. See text accompanying notes 15-27 supra.

127. See text accompanying notes 32-33 smpra.
128. See text accompanying notes 61-62 and 67-69 supra.

129. See text accompanying notes 70-81 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
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